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Abstract
This article challenges the widely-held view that the competition for markets 
and influence between China and the West in sub-Saharan Africa is a zero-sum 
game, with few incentives or opportunities to collaborate. The study examines 
the history and operative framework of the China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and presents two case studies 
– CDB’s loans to Huawei for telecommunications expansion in the region and 
IFC’s Africa Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (AMSME) Program – that 
exemplify each institution’s approach to sub-Saharan Africa’s development 
challenges. These cases, the study finds, reveal a complementary, rather than 
conflictive, dynamic between CDB and IFC’s interests and activities in the 
context of the region’s infrastructure and private sector development. The paper 
argues that these complementarities are too often overlooked, and highlights 
the potential for further cooperation, proposing a mechanism through which 
local governments, global financial institutions, and extra-regional players can 
coordinate efforts to maximize the developmental impact of investment-led 
projects.
Keywords: China-Africa relations; Development finance; China Development 
Bank; Huawei
1. Introduction
Over the past few years, Western analysts have expressed curiosity and concern 
about China-Africa relations, which have become a hot topic in the world of 
international relations and foreign policy. While the mainstream Western me-
dia tends to highlight the problems with Chinese involvement on the continent, 
the Chinese state-run media often focuses solely on the contributions made by 
Chinese companies to African development; both tend to overlook the comple-
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mentary nature of the activities conducted by Western and Chinese agents in 
Africa’s changing economic landscape. Keener observers on both sides (CFR, 
2007; Brookings, 2013; Wang H., 2014) have identified a need for cooperation, 
but some, including the Brookings Institution’s Yun Sun remain cautious about 
its prospects, noting that “exemplary cases of successful cooperation between 
Washington and Beijing on the continent remain scarce” (Sun, 2015). Indeed, 
opinions from the Rand Corporation (Hanauer & Morris, 2013) and the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences (Zhang, 2013) suggest that both sides view 
competition for markets and influence in Africa as a zero-sum game, with few 
incentives or opportunities to collaborate. Yet, the reluctance with which West-
erners and Chinese alike view cooperation and the one-sided headlines used by 
the media are unfounded; the complementary effects of projects already imple-
mented – and the vast potential for future collaboration – are evident. 
This research aims to add to the discourse on African development through 
the examination of development finance flows from Chinese and Western insti-
tutions towards the continent. The study showcases two representative devel-
opment finance institutions (DFIs): the China Development Bank (CDB) and 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC). As a policy bank, CDB derives 
its mandate from the Chinese government, and performs a strategic function 
in China’s foreign policy; as an affiliate of the World Bank, IFC is part of the 
Western-led Bretton Woods system and is charged with promoting investment 
in developing economies. For each DFI, the paper first presents the institution’s 
history and operative framework and then introduces a case study that exempli-
fies its operations in sub-Saharan Africa. CDB’s financing of Huawei’s expan-
sion into the region reflects the bank’s pattern of investing in large infrastructure 
projects undertaken by Chinese companies; IFC’s Africa Micro, Small and Me-
dium Enterprise (AMSME) Program epitomizes the corporation’s preference 
for targeted investments to local players in the private sector. After each case 
study, the paper also outlines the limitations of each institution’s approach.
This study does not attempt to compare activities of each DFI in order to judge 
their effectiveness. Instead, it asserts three main points: first, that China does 
not intend to compete with or replace Western programs in sub-Saharan Africa; 
second, that the nature of CDB and IFC’s activities exemplify the comparative 
advantages of each institution; and third, that while these institutions represent 
different ideologies and motivations, the complementary nature of activities has 
a positive impact on sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development and allows 
African stakeholders greater leverage in directing economic development. 
The study concludes that, in fact, Western and Chinese engagement in sub- 
Saharan Africa is complementary rather than conflictive and presents numerous 
opportunities for collaboration and coordination. This underscores the need to 
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overcome the current academic, political and even economic aversion to co-
operation, which leads to a suboptimal allocation of resources for all parties 
involved: China, the West, and African countries. Finally, building on CDB and 
IFC’s experiences in Africa thus far, the study analyzes the possibility of tar-
geting capital flows towards development projects through a more thoroughly 
integrated syndicated banking program which makes the most of each DFI’s 
comparative advantages, reduces investors’ exposure to risk, takes into account 
local stakeholders’ interests and increases the impact of each project.
1.1 The significance of development finance institutions in Africa
According to William Diamond, an expert on the World Bank Group, “in-
vestment is at the heart of economic development,” and “(DFIs) are designed 
to provide focused financial support to national and regional development” 
(Diamond, 1957). Although these institutions vary greatly, they generally pro-
vide financial services such as loans and grants, equity participation in firms or 
investment funds, and financing for infrastructure projects, all of which serve to 
address development challenges related to the provision of basic services, the 
creation of jobs and the promotion of foreign exchange earnings (Musaisike et 
al., 2004). Moreover, DFIs correct a significant market failure by operating in 
areas which traditional financial institutions tend to avoid due to higher financial 
risks. By focusing on key industries or sectors, DFIs allow for a more efficient 
allocation of resources towards risky yet necessary investments.
In this, CDB and IFC share some similarities: both are risk-taking, 
result-driven organizations, seeking returns on their investments while execut-
ing predefined mandates. These characteristics mean that CDB and IFC present 
an alternative to traditional forms of aid which, some experts contend, have 
been ineffective. Dambisa Moyo, a vocal critic of aid programs, has argued that 
an overreliance on aid has actually hindered Africa’s development and has pro-
posed that governments wean themselves off of their “addiction” to aid, which 
she relates to inefficiency and corruption. Instead, she suggests, courting foreign 
direct investment and nurturing free markets would be more effective in creat-
ing vibrant, robust economies on the continent (Moyo, 2009). CDB and IFC’s 
activities may thus provide more appropriate means of financing African devel-
opment. Demographic trends provide ample reason to believe that returns on in-
vestment are possible, too. The blossoming middle classes of several countries, 
including Ghana, Gabon, and Botswana (AfDB, 2011), are potential sources 
of both capital and consumption, as well as of political pressure on the state 
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(Handley, 2014). This new consumer class will increasingly demand better pub-
lic goods and services including healthcare, education, infrastructure, and the 
rule of law, and will use its political and economic clout to influence its leaders, 
attracting global corporations in the process. 
Telecommunications and financial systems, in particular, present vast oppor-
tunities. The rapid expansion of mobile phone and Internet service penetration 
in Africa has allowed millions of people in the region to engage in economic ac-
tivity and connect to the rest of the world. In 2013, GSMA, an association which 
represents mobile service providers, counted 329 million unique subscribers in 
sub-Saharan Africa, which was then fastest growing region for five years in a 
row and was projected to surpass half a billion users by 2020 (GSMA, 2014). 
Rising incomes – and consequently, savings – have provided an opportunity for 
banks to gain new customers and offer more services, simultaneously benefiting 
their bottom line and society at large. According to the World Bank, the percent-
age of African adults with some kind of formal financial account jumped from 
24% in 2011 to 34% in 2014 (World Bank, 2015a). At the intersection of finan-
cial institutions and telecommunications, innovative mobile money programs 
such as M-PESA have achieved widespread success. The mobile phone-based 
money transfer system, initially launched in Kenya but since replicated through-
out the region, allows users to make deposits, withdraw cash, and transfer mon-
ey using only their basic mobile phones’ SMS feature (The Economist, 2007). 
In 2014, the number of mobile money users in sub-Saharan Africa reached 64 
million, revealing the immense demand for accessible financial services among 
the unbanked poor (World Bank, 2015a). 
The high impacts and encouraging long-term prospects of investments into 
the telecommunications and finance sectors have not escaped CDB and IFC. 
The case studies selected for this paper highlight particularly this: in CDB’s 
case, financing telecom giant Huawei’s foray into Africa, and in IFC’s case pro-
moting the development of an incipient financial sector throughout the region.
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2. CDB and Huawei: A case study in Chinese development finance 
2.1 The origins and mandate of CDB 
Developing under the close watch of the Chinese government, China’s finan-
cial sector remains highly restricted in comparison to those of Western coun-
tries, with all major banks all being state-owned and foreign participation in 
the industry severely limited (Ernst & Young, 2014). Following the Commu-
nist Party’s consolidation of power in 1949, China’s banks were nationalized 
and banking system was centralized under the Ministry of Finance and focused 
on providing credit to state-owned enterprises for their production plans, and 
cash to pay for labor costs and materials (Meyer at al., 2011). Then, after the 
country’s leadership decided to move away from central planning through the 
Reform and Opening Up program in the late 1970s, China began the decentrali-
zation process through which local governments were gradually granted greater 
autonomy to pursue economic growth, financial institutions were diversified, 
and restrictions on lending were loosened.
Those reforms attracted an influx of foreign investment and led to rampant 
lending by the country’s newly empowered banks, which ushered in a peri-
od of rapid, albeit unsustainable growth. In 1992, after China adopted the idea 
of pursuing a “socialist market economy”, bank lending for investment grew 
by 50%, and in 1994, the inflation rate breached 20% (Sanderson & Forsythe, 
2013). Given the financial implications of rising debt and inflation, the Chinese 
government – rather than subscribing to the World Bank’s recommendation of 
liberalizing the financial industry – increased its control over the financial sec-
tor. Under a new round of reforms, direct borrowing by local governments was 
forbidden, tax revenues were redirected towards the central government, and, 
crucially, commercial lending and “policy” lending were separated. 
CDB was created in 1994, along with the Agricultural Development Bank 
of China and the Export-Import Bank of China, as an instrument to execute the 
government’s political and economic objectives in a consolidated fashion. It 
was given a leading role in implementing large scale, long term financing for 
infrastructure and industrial projects considered too risky by traditional com-
mercial lenders. CDB’s strategic importance was further underscored by the 
fact that it became the only bank other than the People’s Bank of China to re-
ceive ministerial rank. Nonetheless, its first steps were clumsy; by 1997 it had a 
non-performing loan ratio of 42.7% (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). It would not 
be an understatement to say that CDB’s success can be credited to the visionary 
work of Chen Yuan, the bank’s chairman from 1998 to 2013. Using innovative 
banking strategies as well as political maneuvering, Chen managed to reduce 
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the non-performing loan ratio to under 5% by 2001, and to less than 1% by 2005 
(Downs, 2011). 
One of CDB’s greatest innovations was the creation of local government fi-
nancing vehicles (LGFVs) to secure loans to finance local infrastructure. LGVFs 
are special financing vehicles created outside local budgets and that can use land 
as collateral for CDB loans. This point was vital, as local governments were for-
bidden from taking on debt. Instead, LGVFs would borrow money on behalf of 
the local governments and use these funds to undertake infrastructure projects 
(Downs, 2011). By keeping the borrowing “in house” through these companies, 
local governments were able to retain the revenue derived from leasing land, 
one of the few marketable resources still under their control. This strategy was 
not without its dark-side, as it provided an incentive for local governments to 
uproot rural families, often without proper compensation. Nonetheless, it made 
possible a number of projects and investments that formed the backbone of 
China’s modernization and economic growth (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). 
Chen Yuan would eventually improve this model of leveraging land values and 
providing loans to LGFVs, and elements of this lending later emerged in CDB’s 
overseas practices. 
Unlike other banks, CDB is backed by bonds with maturities of ten years 
or more bought not only by commercial banks but also directly by the Central 
Government, giving investors – often commercial banks themselves – a sense 
of confidence and security. Under one regulation, in order for CDB to provide 
loans, the banks used by the LGFVs to mediate land sales would first need to 
pay the proceeds to the local CDB branch before those could be transferred to 
the municipal LGFV. By operating in this fashion, CDB gained greater oversight 
over the transfer and use of funds and the ability to ensure receipt of payment 
from the loans. Under another regulation, Chen Yuan sought to limit political 
interference and opportunities for corruption in the lending process. In order to 
create a commercially viable practice, a stringent procedure for the selection of 
projects was put into place. Loan applications would be evaluated separately by 
four bureaus within CDB, with their assessments then forwarded to a lending 
committee, headed by a vice-governor, which votes on each application by reg-
istered ballot (Downs, 2011).
CDB’s investments in infrastructure projects helped offset the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis that crippled so many of China’s neighboring economies at the 
time. Between 1996 and 1998, spending on infrastructure in China nearly dou-
bled; by 2002, it had tripled, with CDB’s loans accounting for 28% of all loans 
to the sector. Following the crisis, their value would only keep rising, from 
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226.9 billion yuan in 2003 to over 1 trillion yuan in 2009 (Sanderson & For-
sythe, 2013). In 2008, the global financial crisis again required a rapid response 
by the Chinese government, which deployed CDB in order to keep the Chi-
nese economy afloat. In November of that year, a 4 trillion yuan stimulus pack-
age was announced, 3.2 trillion yuan of which would be administered by CDB 
(Naughton, 2009). By 2010, CDB lending to LGFVs would surpass 5 trillion 
yuan (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). Since 2013, CDB has promoted the re-
structuring and consolidation of key sectors in order to streamline the industrial 
landscape, while lending 241.7 billion yuan to strategic and emerging indus-
tries, including renewable energy and circular economics projects (CDB, 2014). 
As these domestic developments were underway, China also accelerated 
efforts to internationalize its most successful companies. After receiving the 
Chinese Communist Party’s endorsement at the Sixteenth National Congress 
in 2002, “Going Out” was implemented as a national policy and strategy. Its 
objective was to increase exports of Chinese goods and services, and support 
Chinese companies, both private and state-owned, to help them establish and 
gain market share in their overseas operations. Deborah Brautigam notes in 
The Dragon’s Gift, that “Chinese companies at the high end would be asked to 
establish brand names with global recognition. They would be encouraged to 
invest overseas, establish factories, and buy property. Small and medium-sized 
companies would also be encouraged to go out, particularly those at the lower 
end, where moving offshore would aid China’s domestic restructuring” (Brau-
tigam, 2009, p. 75). In 2008, the hard hit taken by the Chinese economy as the 
global financial crisis led the U.S. and Europe to reduce their imports of Chinese 
goods, led policy-makers to double-down on efforts to help national industries 
diversify their international markets, notably in the developing world.
Throughout this process, CDB fulfilled its role in advancing Chinese policy 
interests by securing financing for the overseas expansion of Chinese compa-
nies, particularly state-owned infrastructure construction companies, that would 
otherwise find difficulties in traditional financial markets due to the inherent risk 
and large borrowing requirements for the projects they undertake. In some cas-
es, these very investments serve further strategic interests, by financing infra-
structure projects intended to deliver energy or other resources supplies back to 
China, such as the US$1.8 billion Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline (CDB, 2006). 
Finally, CDB assists energy companies abroad by providing credit to foreign en-
ergy and mining companies, particularly those who are offered long-term sup-
ply contracts, upstream equity positions or equipment manufacturing contracts 
that will ultimately serve the Chinese market (Downs, 2011). Regarding Africa 
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specifically, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 
2000 to create a platform for dialogue and establish guidelines for coopera-
tion, gained an ever greater profile as ever greater investments, exchanges and 
commitment were declared at each periodic summit. After the third ministerial 
conference, in 2006, the Chinese government announced the creation of the 
China-Africa Development Fund, to be capitalized by Chinese financial institu-
tions including CDB, to “encourage and support Chinese companies to invest in 
Africa” (Li et al., 2012).
China’s homegrown telecommunications companies have also benefitted 
greatly from CDB financing under the “Going Out” policy. Brautigam refers to 
this as “nurturing ‘dragon heads’ (national champions) to be globally compet-
itive multinational firms” (Brautigam, 2009). As the fastest growing market in 
terms of subscribers, sub-Saharan Africa represents a particularly attractive. By 
2020, the region is projected to have 504 million unique subscribers and nearly 
one billion connections (GSMA, 2014). 
2.2. Huawei’s CDB-financed Expansion into Sub-Saharan Africa
Founded in 1987, Huawei first began exporting its products in 1996 and has 
since overtaken its competitors to become China’s largest maker of phone equip-
ment and telecommunications infrastructure. Not surprisingly, given the size of 
the Chinese market and its successful overseas expansions, Huawei surpassed 
Sweden’s Ericsson in 2012 to become the world largest manufacturer of tele-
communications equipment (The Economist, 2012). What makes it something 
of an outlier among Chinese companies that succeeded abroad is that, unlike 
most recipients of policy bank financing, including its competitor ZTE, Huawei 
has never been state-owned; it was born, and has remained, a private company. 
Huawei’s highly respected growth strategy is often compared to the 
Maoist strategy of “seizing the countryside”, due to its focus of expanding first 
in overlooked, peripheral areas, before competing for market share in large, 
urban centers. In its early days, Huawei marketed its digital telephone switches 
aggressively in smaller towns, and only later did it target the big cities. This 
same strategy has been employed in the company’s international expansion, 
which first targeted underserved communities in Russia and Africa before mov-
ing into the saturated markets of Western Europe (Chang et al., 2009). 
To finance its overseas expansion, Huawei received a US$30 billion credit 
line from CDB, beginning with an initial injection of US$10 billion in 2004 
(Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). The company’s forays into new markets have re-
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lied heavily on vendor financing, a mechanism with roots in the LGVFs. Vendor 
financing allows Huawei to extend credit to its customers – that is, telephone 
and data service providers around the globe – in order to assist them in purchas-
ing Huawei’s equipment. As of 2009, the company had 270 operators in 100 
countries and employed over 83,000 people (Chang et al, 2009). Huawei’s Afri-
can operations began in Kenya in 1998, and by 2011, its sales on the continent 
spread across 40 countries and totaled over US$3.42 billion, an increase of 15% 
from the previous year (Ombok, 2012).
Figure 1. structure oF cdB-huaWei Loans
The figure above offers a visual representation of vendor financing, illustrat-
ing the exchanges between CDB, Huawei, and its overseas customers. Gener-
ally the process is initiated by Huawei, which selects projects and recommends 
them to CDB; many of the elements of the LGVF model are employed when as-
sessing which projects will receive investments. After CDB approves the loan, 
it provides a line of credit to a financial institution in the customer’s country. 
The customer will receive the funds from their local bank and will then use this 
money to purchase equipment from Huawei, which signs a commercial contract 
with the customer. The financial intermediary in the customer’s home country 
will then be responsible for paying back the loan to CDB. To leverage risk, CDB 
and Huawei devised system in which potential losses and liabilities are shared 
by both firms. 
Source: China Development Bank and Renmin University, 2007 in Sanderson & Forsythe, 
2013)
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This process is similar to – and sometimes overlaps with – the resource-for- 
infrastructure or “Angola” model, which has been used widely in deals with 
governments who lack the financial resources to fund infrastructure projects 
but are rich in the natural resources which China’s industries and consumers 
need. Through this method, money is never transferred directly to the recipient 
government. Instead, a framework agreement is signed through which the local 
government and CDB agree on the infrastructure project to receive investment, 
and the infrastructure project is contracted to a Chinese firm, which is then paid 
from the credits provided by CDB. In Angola’s case, repayment of the credit 
line was made in oil extracted by a Chinese company, although a wide variety 
of arrangements have been struck with different countries. This financing model 
has allowed countries with limited creditworthiness but with abundant natural 
resources to finance infrastructure projects. It is important to note, however, 
that the model’s sustainability has come into question given the collapse in the 
prices of numerous commodities since 2013. 
In expanding abroad, Huawei has diversified away from manufacturing and 
has embraced a new role as a comprehensive telecom service provider. While 
a majority of Huawei’s revenues still come from equipment sales, the company 
has been securing local contracts for constructing telecom infrastructure, of-
ten with CDB’s backing. In 2006, Huawei won a US$100 million contract to 
become the leading CDMA network provider for Nigeria’s Multi-Links, one 
of Nigeria’s private network providers (Xinhua, 2006). Huawei also secured 
a partnership in 2006 with Starcomms Nigeria Limited, the country’s largest 
telecom operator, to deploy first mobile broadband network allowing subscrib-
ers to watch streaming video and media through their smartphones (Huawei, 
2006a). Another major project backed by Huawei in 2006 is the construction of 
a US$10 million Technology Support and Training Center in Nigeria’s capital 
city, Abuja. The Center will provide tech support for the Western African region 
and training services for up to two thousand individuals a year (Huawei, 2006b) 
In 2008, Huawei opened up a Training Center in South Africa that aims to trans-
fer skills and expertise on next generation telecom technologies to employees, 
local employers and the industry (Huawei, 2008). In addition, Huawei has also 
made great strides in gaining market share for consumer handsets, with over a 
million devices sold in South Africa in 2014 (Sibanda, 2015). The International 
Data Corporation placed Huawei third in the country, with a 6.9% share, at a 
considerable distance from Samsung’s 56.6%, but a stone’s throw from Voda-
com’s 7.6% (Alfreds, 2015).
The company’s ability to provide high-end products and services at compet-
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itive prices has allowed Huawei to overcome the association to cheaply made, 
poor-quality goods that often plagues Chinese firms. Nonetheless, according to 
Huawei’s former head of operations in West Africa, Huawei manages to achieve 
profit margins 10 times greater in Africa than it does in China, while pricing 
itself 5%-15% lower than major international competitors such as Ericsson and 
Nokia (Chang et al., 2009).
Chinese engagement in the telecommunications industry, much like its par-
ticipation in other areas of infrastructure, has included several large-scale, high-
ly visible projects which were implemented quickly and benefitted their users 
directly. In fact, Chinese financing has extended beyond ground-based tele-
communications, all the way to space. Nigeria’s third communication satellite, 
NigComSat-1, for example, was viewed with hesitation by Western investors, 
leaving only China’s Great Wall Industry Corporation to bid on time, on budget, 
and up to the Nigerian government’s standards (Xinhua, 2012). It has been as-
serted that the telecommunications industry in Africa has developed “to a de-
gree that would otherwise have been impossible” without the help of Chinese 
vendor financing (Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, 2008). 
2.3 Limitations of CDB  
The success of China’s “Going Global” strategy is in large part due to CDB’s 
behind-the-scenes financing. Erica Downs, a fellow at the Brookings Institute, 
notes that CDB is “a link between the strategic ambitions of the Chinese gov-
ernment and the commercial interests of Chinese firms, because the financing 
it provides to support cross-border deals connects state policy to commercial 
activities” (Downs, 2011). Despite its cumbersome role, CDB displays a strong 
performance even when compared to Western banks. As of 2013, CDB assets 
grew to 8.19 trillion yuan (roughly equivalent to US$1.4 trillion in 2013), with 
a non-performing loan ratio of 0.48%. It posted a year-end profit of 79.9 billion 
yuan (roughly US$13.6 billion) (CDB, 2014).
One limitation for CDB is its comparatively narrow focus on executing Chi-
nese government policy, which limits the institution’s ability to invest in other, 
potentially more lucrative ventures. While CDB has some autonomy in identify-
ing which projects meet the criteria of China’s policy objectives, its operations 
remain limited to the mandate defined by the Chinese government. This man-
date and the bank’s critical role in assisting Chinese companies in their overseas 
expansion efforts reveal some specific targets that the Chinese government has 
set for itself in Africa. Securing energy supply and natural resources, boosting 
the international competitiveness of Chinese industries, and cementing ties with 
African governments all ultimately further China’s national interests. 
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These activities, however, also give China a perhaps unwanted degree of 
visibility on the global stage. The actions of its banks, firms and citizens are 
increasingly scrutinized, with any malpractice, negligence or imprudence com-
promising the country’s reputation. It is important to note, in this context, that 
Huawei’s case is exceptional; the largest beneficiaries of CDB financing tend 
to be state-owned enterprises, reducing the Chinese authorities’ ability to claim 
plausible deniability or avoid responsibility for wrongdoings. Among CDB’s 
weaknesses is a notable lack of transparency, as investments are negotiated on 
a case-by-case basis behind closed doors; it is unclear which, if any, safeguards 
are in place to counter negative environmental or social impacts and to reduce 
opportunities for corruption. Further, Western concerns and anxieties over what 
is perceived to be Chinese support for non-democratic regimes, particularly in 
Africa, can have considerable repercussions in the international political arena.
3. IFC and the Africa Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Program:  
A case study in Western development finance
3.1 The origins and mandate of IFC
IFC was established as an affiliate of the World Bank in 1956, but its origins 
can be traced back to 1951, when the United States International Development 
Advisory Board proposed the establishment of an institution that could facil-
itate the flow of private capital from world money markets to developing na-
tions (Matecki, 1957). Under the World Bank’s original Articles of Agreement, 
loans provided to private companies needed to be backed by governments, and 
projects were expected to fulfill a number of criteria beyond those related to 
the project’s economic soundness (Snavely, 1958). Moreover, the bureaucratic 
processes required by the World Bank and the implications of government inter-
ference discouraged private individuals or institutions in developing countries 
from seeking assistance. Robert L. Garner, vice-president of the World Bank at 
the time, summarized the proposed corporation’s functions at the Inter-Ameri-
can Investment Conference in 1955:
“We will not be interested in the schemes of promoters. But we will be 
interested in well-studied projects brought to us by serious businessmen 
who have capital of their own to invest. Once we have a serious proposal 
in hand, we think one of the institution’s most important functions will be 
to interest other investors, either domestic or foreign, in the project. As far 
as financing is concerned, the Corporation will view itself as the last resort, 
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and not the first; and the institution will not invest in projects where the 
entrepreneur himself is not carrying the fullest share of the investment.”1
Garner was appointed the corporation’s first president when the IFC Charter 
entered into force the next year, with 31 member countries, authorized capital 
of US$100 million and capital subscriptions of US$78 million (World Bank 
Group, 2014).
Unlike CDB, IFC is not affiliated with any one particular country, but, in as 
much as it reflects the Western consensus on democracy and on development 
via market-based mechanisms, it shares some characteristics with policy banks. 
Although the corporation is formally owned by its 184 member countries, cur-
rent shareholding arrangements imply that OECD nations account for roughly 
two thirds voting power (IFC, 2014a). Moreover, eighteen of the 25 members 
of the board of directors that governs the corporation are nationals of countries 
that could be considered aligned with neoliberal economic views (World Bank, 
2015b). This majority worldview is reflected in IFC’s activities, which are heav-
ily focused on the private sector. Products and services encompass loans, equity, 
venture capital, trade and supply chain finance, treasury solutions, asset man-
agement and advisory services, while its areas of expertise include agribusiness 
and forestry, financial institutions, funds, health and education, infrastructure, 
manufacturing, oil, gas, and mining, public-private partnerships, telecommuni-
cations, media and technology, and tourism, retail and property (IFC, n.d.a). In 
Fiscal Year 2015, IFC had 406 projects in 83 countries, with long-term invest-
ments totaling US$17.7 billion, including over US$7 billion mobilized from 
other investors (IFC, 2015a).
Accounting for over US$4 billion of those external investments, the Syndi-
cated Loans Program is arguably IFC’s signature program. Established in 1957, 
it serves as a platform for mobilizing investments from public and private stake-
holders across the world. The Syndicated Loan Program brings together an ar-
ray of financial institutions, including local, regional, and global commercial 
banks, DFIs, various types of funds, and insurance companies, among others. 
The products offered to these financial partners include: B Loans, which are of-
fered to commercial banks; Parallel Loans, offered to DFIs and local banks; and 
a Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Program through which institutional investors 
provide IFC with capital on a portfolio basis and participate passively in future 
projects. To date, over US$50 billion has been mobilized for over 1,000 projects 
in more than 110 countries (IFC, 2015b).
1 From an address delivered by Robert L. Garner, then vice president of the World Bank, at the 
Inter-American Conference, New Orleans, March 3, 1955
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IFC’s experience and reputation have helped it bring together a broad net-
work of investors to fund projects that enable economic development in emerg-
ing economies. DFIs participating in the Parallel Loans program include the 
Asian Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the 
Islamic Development Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; 
IFC’s first and so far only partner in the Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Pro-
gram is the People’s Bank of China, which pledged to invest US$3 billion (IFC, 
2013c). The presence of a wide spectrum of financial institutions working to-
wards investment projects in emerging markets is a sign of confidence in IFC’s 
ability to generate positive developmental impacts while delivering returns. In 
Fiscal Year 2015, US$1.7 billion were committed to sub-Saharan Africa under 
the Syndicated Loans Program, accounting for 11% of the US$15.3 billion com-
mitted worldwide (IFC, 2015c).
Aside from financing, Advisory Services is perhaps the most important for 
IFC’s strategic operations in developing countries. Their purpose is to assist 
governments in improving the overall environment for private investment, in-
crease the efficiency and effectiveness of investments, offer assistance in pro-
ject implementation, achieve positive developmental impacts, and enhance the 
borrower’s creditworthiness. Through Advisory Services, governments and 
businesses gain access to global expertise on best practices, impact metrics, 
transparency and demand-driven project development. At the end of Fiscal Year 
2015, IFC’s portfolio had more than 600 active advisory projects in 101 coun-
tries, valued at US$1.2 billion (IFC, n.d.b). The program has been particularly 
active in sub-Saharan Africa, which, at 26.5%, accounted for the largest portion 
of Advisory Service’s US$202.1 million in expenditures in Fiscal Year 2015 
(IFC, 2015a). 
3.2. Access to finance and the Africa Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 
program  
Within IFC’s Advisory Services, the Access to Finance Program is one of the 
largest programs in terms of value and number of projects. Expenditures on 
this program reached US$68 million in Fiscal Year 2014, accounting for 29% 
of Advisory Services’ total expenditures (IFC, 2014a). Access to Finance is 
essentially focused on financial inclusion, aiming to “increase the availability 
and affordability of financial services for individuals and for micro, small, and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs)” (IFC, 2014a). Funds often target financial infra-
structure, supporting the creation and development of credit bureaus, securities 
markets, collateral registries, and payment systems, and advisors work closely 
with local government to improve the legal and regulatory framework as well.
African Review of Economics and Finance
92
Over a century ago, the economist Joseph Schumpeter (1911) argued that 
financial intermediaries provide services - including mobilizing savings, eval-
uating projects, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions – that are 
essential for economic development. While functioning financial systems offer 
savings, credit, payment and risk management products, the most basic role of 
a bank is to provide a safe place in which a customer can store capital. Poor 
individuals without access to a formal banking system must instead rely on 
limited savings to invest in their own education and business ventures. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, the world’s unbanked population still exceeds 2 billion, 
and sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 350 million of those people (World Bank, 
2015a); Moyo (2009) put the credit gap faced by the region’s MSMEs at over 
US$2 trillion. The limited availability of financing available to MSMEs limits 
their potential, despite the fact that they account for up to 67% of employers and 
86% of new jobs created (IMF, 2012). 
Identifying new opportunities amidst the proliferation of MSMEs throughout 
the region and the rapid economic growth experienced by a handful of sub-Sa-
haran African countries, IFC’s Africa Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 
(AMSME) Program was established in 2006. Its goal has been to support the 
growth of the type of businesses that are responsible for the majority of employ-
ment and comprise a significant portion of the region’s economies. The program 
is carried out via three main avenues: first, long-term finance to partner banks so 
they are able to increase lending; second, long-term advisory services, including 
resident advisors, to assist in establishing and expanding programs; and third, 
an incentive structure that encourages banks to increase lending and attain other 
targets. By the end of 2015, IFC was working with 110 financial institutions in 
30 sub-Saharan African countries, and its long-term finance MSME portfolio in 
the region reached US$1.4 billion (IFC, 2015d).
The direct impacts that IFC’s Advisory Services in general, and the AMSME 
program in particular, have had throughout the region are illustrated in the mil-
lions of loans that partner financial institutions went on to provide. In Ghana for 
example, IFC and World Bank advisors collaborated with the Bank of Ghana 
and provided the government with technical advice and training to update the 
Ghana’s Borrowers & Lenders Act in 2008. The updated act implemented a col-
lateral registry program that enables borrowers to use movable assets as collat-
eral, and by December 2012, more than 9,000 SMEs and 30,000 microbusiness-
es had received over US$6 billion in loans backed by movable property (IFC, 
2013a). In another project, IFC partnered with Mozambique’s Banco Comercial 
de Investimentos to train over 50 women entrepreneurs in management skills 
– including planning, budgeting, customer relations, sales and marketing – and 
helped them develop business plans to gain access to finance from the bank (IFC, 
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2011a). In Tanzania, IFC worked with Access Bank to reach out to rural popula-
tions, developing in 2013 a new agricultural loan product that takes into account 
farmers’ variable incomes and allows for more flexible repayment schedules 
aligned to the crop calendar. By the end of that year, demand proved to exceed 
expectations, with agricultural loans reaching US$200,000 (IFC, 2015e).
In order to guarantee transparency and track outcomes, IFC instituted its De-
velopment Outcome Tracking System (DOTS). This system provides valuable 
information on the impact, outcomes, and effectiveness of projects under OECD 
guidelines. The commitment to providing stakeholders with measurable results 
allows IFC to ensure that the projects have a positive return on investment. De-
velopment impact for Advisory Services projects is assessed every six months, 
and at project completion, overall developmental effectiveness is determined. In 
Africa, a team of results management specialists joins project teams to collect 
and validate results throughout the project term. A second, external evaluation 
group – the Independent Evaluation Group - is employed long-term to monitor 
IFC progress and adherence to its goals. The combination of internal and ex-
ternal monitors allows IFC to identify strengths and weaknesses and improve 
continually in its methods, increasing the probability of achieving positive out-
comes (IFC, 2015a).
3.3. Limitations of IFC 
IFC reported US$445 million in net income for Fiscal Year 2015, a precipitous 
drop from the US$1.483 billion reaped a year earlier (IFC, 2015a). This trend 
may be related to the World Bank Group’s ongoing restructuring process, and 
could have further effects on IFC’s operations and finances. The strains on lead-
ership have been evidenced by several high-profile departures, including that of 
IFC’s CEO since 2012, Jin-Yong Cai, a Chinese national and former Goldman 
Sachs executive, who announced his departure at the end of 2014 amid tensions 
over the approval of an investment into the Postal Savings Bank of China (Don-
nan, 2015).  
 In spite of the current turmoil, IFC’s basic function and philosophy is unlike-
ly to change. Run by its member countries, which include industrialized nations 
with a wealth of knowledge and experience in financial sector development, IFC 
operates under a firm belief that a healthy private sector and a functional finan-
cial system are central to tackling economic challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. 
IFC stimulates private sector development, financial markets, and entrepreneur-
ship in developing countries by lending to and investing in for-profit ventures. 
The positive impacts of its activities in the region do not preclude the 
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corporation from suffering limitations, though. Significantly smaller in terms of 
assets and loans compared to CDB, IFC is deliberately conservative in the scale 
and scope of its activities on the continent. Smaller working capital and a lim-
ited mandate forces IFC to choose smaller, conventional projects that may not 
produce high returns on investment or development impacts as large and visible 
as those provided by a new highway, a new power plant, or a new telecom net-
work. Furthermore, IFC’s work in developing financial systems and increasing 
access to banking services in Africa are highly reliant on a stable economic and 
political environment, and on functional infrastructure. Without the basic infra-
structure necessary to support their work, as is the case in much of sub-Saharan 
Africa, IFC may actually be impeded from serving the areas that need its ser-
vices most. However, IFC funding for infrastructure in Africa surpassed US$1 
billion in 2012, and its and then-CEO Jin-Yong Cai, declared the continent’s 
infrastructure to be a priority (IFC, 2012). 
IFC’s convoluted governance structure may also reduce its effectiveness in 
identifying and undertaking high-impact projects. As seen in Jin-Yong Cai’s 
departure, the board of directors is not immune to political wrangling, as a num-
ber of Western countries abstained from voting on projects involving Chinese 
banks (Donnan, 2015). Moreover, the corporation’s investors, which include 
government bodies, commercial banks, and private foundations, represent a di-
verse array of objectives, motivations, and ideologies. With each of these dif-
ferent players pursuing their own interests and providing their own input into 
the process of selecting and executing projects, developmental objectives can 
sometimes take a back seat. At the same time, the large number and wide variety 
of projects being undertaking implies that no single project can ever have IFC’s 
full dedication, suggesting that the corporation runs the risk of stretching itself 
thin. The fact that IFC also tends to work through local financial institutions can 
dilute its effective control over projects, leading to increased risks.
4. CDB and IFC: Competing or complementary?
Yu Xiangdong, a Shanghai-based scholar, when asked what French companies 
could do to compete with Chinese companies in securing contracts to build 
infrastructure in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, simply said, “You can never beat 
China; you can only turn yourself into the IBM of construction” (Sanderson & 
Forsythe, 2013). This meant that the French could not compete directly with the 
Chinese, but, much like how IBM transitioned from hardware to information 
technology services, they could become consulting companies, marketing their 
vast knowledge and experience to those looking to operate in France’s former 
colonies. 
95
Mothe and Pontemayor: Complementarities of Chinese and Western development finance
Yu’s observation highlights the competitive advantages of Western and Chi-
nese institutions: while the West is unmatched in know-how, China is unrivalled 
in financing. These differences are reflected in the core goals of IFC and CDB: 
providing support for local private sector development and financing the con-
struction of large-scale infrastructure projects by Chinese companies, respec-
tively. By employing their best practices to the areas in which they are special-
ized, these institutions achieve tangible developmental impacts and results. The 
success of CDB and Huawei’s contributions to bridging Africa’s digital gap and 
of IFC’s efforts to develop a robust financial sector on the continent, resulted in 
immediate improvements for citizens and businesses alike.
Both IFC and CDB have distinct competitive advantages. IFC was a pioneer 
in demonstrating that the private sector has a central role to play in international 
development; its success has made it the world’s largest and most reputable in-
ternational DFI focused exclusively on for-profit businesses. CDB spearheaded 
China’s efforts to turn domestic companies into global brands while sharing the 
country’s immense capacity to undertake large-scale projects; it has since be-
come a major financier of infrastructure projects in the developing world. In part 
thanks to CDB’s efforts, China has secured the reputation of having the world’s 
most competitive construction and infrastructure development industries.
The mandate of each institution also reflects the ideological paradigm through 
which they view their work in Africa. On one hand, IFC’s focus on improving 
access to finance and the environment for businesses reflects Western values of 
trust in the private sector and the wisdom of market forces, a view which pre-
vails among the corporation’s largest shareholders and well represented in its 
board of directors. Given capital and advice, rational, profit-maximizing firms 
and individuals will allocate resources efficiently, spurring economic growth. 
When this process is successful, the IFC, its investors and its beneficiaries reap 
the returns. On the other hand, CDB subscribes to a development model based 
on urbanization and large investments in infrastructure. With increased con-
nectivity – be it through road, rail or fiber optics – labor, goods and services, 
capital, and knowledge will be better able to circulate throughout and beyond a 
country’s territory. Aside from profit motives, CDB derives its mandate from the 
Chinese government, and also has the objective of executing its economic and 
foreign policy agendas, helping Chinese firms expand abroad and strengthening 
ties between Beijing and its foreign partners.
Despite their different worldviews and objectives, both institutions contrib-
ute to sub-Saharan Africa’s development, and in at least one occasion, CDB 
and IFC have been able to work together. In 2011, in the first ever syndication 
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between Chinese banks and IFC, CDB and the Export-Import Bank of China 
contributed US$45 million and US$27 million respectively towards a US$115 
million financing package offered to Vodafone Ghana for the development of 
that country’s telecommunication infrastructure (IFC, 2011b). At the time, Ser-
gio Pimenta, IFC’s Director for East Asia-Pacific, declared that the partnership 
between IFC and Chinese banks “will contribute to making Chinese projects 
sustainable and in the long-run more profitable” (IFC, 2011c). Since then, how-
ever, cooperation between IFC and Chinese companies in the region has re-
mained limited. It includes a US$22 million loan from IFC to CRJE Estate Ltd 
for the construction of a 29-story hotel in Tanzania (IFC, 2013b); a US$112.5 
million syndicated loan from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to 
help IHS Nigeria expand its mobile phone infrastructure (IFC, 2014b), and the 
creation of the US$300 million IFC-CITIC joint investment platform to devel-
op environmentally-friendly, affordable urban housing in sub-Saharan Africa, 
starting with projects in Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria (IFC, 2015f).
CDB and IFC do not appear to have collaborated again in the region, yet, 
together, they present African governments with a variety of tools and strategies 
with which to foster economic development. At once, having options allows 
those African governments more leverage in negotiating conditions for invest-
ments, and they need not choose one over the other, when they can clearly ben-
efit from both. A report conducted by the United States Government Accounta-
bility Office in 2013 suggests that there is very little direct competition between 
American and Chinese firms in Africa. Indeed, when looking at CDB and IFC, 
there is no apparent conflict between infrastructure projects and the strengthen-
ing of the private sector. Instead, what is becomes evident is the complementa-
rity between these projects. While CDB-financed projects promote connectivi-
ty, IFC activities provide liquidity. Both result in more modern, integrated and 
dynamic economies throughout the region, opening opportunities as much for 
local entrepreneurs as for multi-national corporations. 
In terms of what they offer to Africa’s development, the synergetic nature of 
their activities is clear. A concrete example of how this may work could be pro-
vided by CDB-financed telecommunication networks, which can aid IFC’s Ac-
cess to Finance efforts by expanding the reach of mobile banking. The sectors 
that CDB and IFC formally invest in are both necessary components in the foun-
dation of a strong economy. In order to grow, businesses require dependable 
infrastructure that facilitates transport and communication and guarantees the 
provision of inputs such as electricity and running water, minimizing uncertain-
ty and increasing the ability to access new markets. Individuals too, need access 
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to information and a means through which to participate in the labor market and 
receive the wages needed to improve their quality of life.
If African governments are to make the best use of CDB and IFC engagement, 
then they mustn’t overlook each of their weaknesses. One of most criticized as-
pects of CDB – and of China’s international engagement at large – is the lack 
of transparency when it comes to its activities abroad and the methods through 
which it secures international contracts. A lack of reliable data precludes an 
accurate assessment of the institutional and financial health of the Chinese gov-
ernment and consequently of its related institutions. Fears of economic insta-
bility in the context of a weak regulatory framework are a cause of concern. 
IFC, while far more transparent, lacks the vast financial capital of CDB. This 
prohibits the organization from funding larger projects that would benefit far 
more people. Furthermore, with its broad range of stakeholders, bureaucratic 
hurdles can stall the approval and execution of projects and limit flexibility and 
response time when challenges arise.  
Despite these shortcomings, the growing number of development finance 
players operating in sub-Saharan Africa presents the region’s governments with 
more options than ever with which to grow their economies. The emergence 
of finance institutions from other developing nations such as Brazil, India, and 
Indonesia, even provides alternatives to established Western and Chinese in-
stitutions. In this increasingly competitive environment, cooperation between 
Western and Chinese institutions could not only benefit African economies, but 
could also create opportunities for mutual institutional improvement. Chinese 
financial institutions, raised in a protected domestic market, can benefit from 
Western experiences operating in commercial financial markets and can adopt 
better practices regarding transparency, impact assessment and social and envi-
ronmental safeguards. Meanwhile, Western institutions can learn from China’s 
expertise in providing financing “packages”, which couple loans, project exe-
cution, and innovative repayment options, while also reconsidering the impor-
tance of infrastructure and industrial development projects.
4.1. Making the most of complementarity: Opportunities for cooperation
Collaboration between IFC, CDB and African governments could increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of investments. One important first step would be 
for them to create channels for dialogue, to share best practices and identify 
opportunities for coordination at least, and cooperation at best. In a tripartite fo-
rum, African governments could define priority areas for investment, and CDB 
and IFC could design projects that combine their areas of expertise. A telecom 
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project, for example, could use Chinese hardware and construction firms while 
IFC support MSMEs providing ancillary services to those firms or engaging 
in the commerce and repair of handsets and computers operating on the new 
network. IFC could further help other local companies upgrade their commu-
nications equipment, which would increase their productivity. This expansion 
of the discourse of investment-led development finance in Africa could build 
on FOCAC’s design and on events such as the World Bank’s Investing in Af-
rica Forum (World Bank, 2015c). Integrating workshops that highlight current 
projects, strategies, or research that each side is conducting, the probability of 
positive outcomes for all stakeholders would be significantly increased.
Another possibility for collaboration would be the creation of a banking syn-
dicate integrating the expertise of CDB and IFC with that of other banking in-
stitutions, under the direction of African leaders. This syndicate, which could 
include commercial lenders and other significant DFIs such as the African De-
velopment Bank and Brazilian Development Bank, would pool resources into a 
sizeable fund, and would collaborate with African governments to channel large 
investments towards integrated projects. This would allow African governments 
to finance projects beyond the scope of any single bank: an entire highway sys-
tem, for example, as opposed to one road. This would provide ample opportu-
nities for Chinese firms, and, as detailed in the previous paragraph, for MSMEs 
offering ancillary services. Using IFC’s Syndicated Loans program as a prece-
dent, risks from the investment would be shared among all member institutions, 
thus limiting the exposure of each particular one.
One downside of this approach is that it might actually reduce African gov-
ernments’ leverage in negotiating more favorable deals. In order to counter this 
risk, certain guidelines could be built into the syndicate’s structure: African 
governments could set the criteria for bids, and projects could require a certain 
amount of local employees and managers, technology transfers, and strict envi-
ronmental and social safeguards. African governments would also have to have 
a minimum stake in each project, a guarantee of (and incentive for) their com-
mitment to its success. Balancing each party’s risks and incentives and bringing 
each of their advantages to the fore, while maintaining a focus on tangible re-
sults and sustainability would provide the key to success in such a model.
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5. Conclusion
The positive alignments and potential synergies between China, the West and 
Africa are rarely addressed in Western or Chinese media. Amid accusations of 
neocolonialism, meddling, resource exploitation, and hegemonic ambitions, in-
stances of legitimate cooperation have gone largely unacknowledged; much less 
has been said about the nuanced ways in which Chinese investments have aided 
the viability of Western investments and vice-versa. This paper has highlight-
ed the competitive advantages of CDB and IFC and has explained how infra-
structure and financial sector projects can be mutually beneficial and are indeed 
crucial to the region’s development. It has also analyzed the forms that a more 
direct cooperation between both institutions, as well as African governments, 
could take. In what might constitute a significant first step in that direction, as 
of September 2013, the Chinese government had committed up to US$3 billion 
for joint investments in emerging markets through IFC’s Managed Co-Lending 
Portfolio Program (IFC, 2013c). In making this commitment, China has given 
IFC the authority to make decisions on loan origination, structuring and port-
folio management. Furthermore, a handful of joint projects between IFC and 
Chinese banks and firms give reason for cautious optimism. This demonstration 
of active cooperation visibly demonstrates that foreign policy is not set in stone, 
and that in spite of mutual wariness, truly “win-win-win” engagements between 
Western, Chinese and African institutions are possible.
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